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Introduction 
Conventional wisdom has long had it that the ummah—the worldwide Islamic community—will 
never become a truly cohesive entity. Presumably, the Muslim in Amman and the Muslim in 
Djakarta and the Muslim in Dakar and the Muslim in Toronto have little to say to each other 
because their languages, national cultures, and politics differ greatly, and those differences 
outweigh any linkage provided by their common religious beliefs.  
But if satellite television and the Internet were to provide an environment conducive to Islamic 
discourse and serve as a platform on which to build a new level of cohesion within the ummah 
and its 1.3 billion members, global geopolitical balances might be altered significantly.  
A Very Different World 
Policymakers would be wise to consider how even a partially unified ummah would make for a 
very different world. The Muslim community comprises much more than the Middle East, although 
that region receives the most attention from governments and the public. It is the Arab population 
nearly quintupled and spread across the globe. If this massive group were to develop a 
meaningful level of unity, its potential power could be enormous and crafting policy related to the 
community of Islam would become a far more challenging task.  
That prospect is not as farfetched as it once seemed, primarily because of the reach and speed 
of new mass media. The surge of anger in reaction to the 2005 Newsweek story about 
desecration of the Qur’an at the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the swift 
spread of the 2006 Danish cartoon controversy illustrated how a story told on television and 
computer screens can quickly resonate in the farthest reaches of the Muslim world.  
Media-Based Cohesion 
Prospects for media-based cohesion are enhanced by the nature of new information and 
communications technologies. Members of dispersed groups, wherever they are, can collect 
news from sources ranging from Al Jazeera to individual bloggers. In addition to people in 
predominantly Muslim countries, deracinated Muslim communities in Europe and elsewhere may 
be particularly eager to connect to media offerings that engender a sense of belonging and 
provide electronic ties to home and religion. How this may affect assimilation of Muslims who live 
in largely non-Muslim environments is not yet known. It could provide a reassuring comfort zone 
that makes their new home amidst a different culture seem less threatening because links to the 
larger Islamic world can be maintained through media. Or, those virtual connections might make 
that former homeland seem close enough at hand to make integration into the new community 
appear less necessary or desirable.  
The Qur’an (49:10) says, “The believers are a band of brothers.” This principal is at the heart of 
the idea of the ummah, although it has been interpreted in different ways concerning matters 
such as inclusiveness. Anthony Shadid defines it in historical context as “the notion of an Islamic 
community created when Mohammed’s disparate followers began to look beyond their clan and 
tribal affiliations in Arabia to see themselves foremost as Muslims.” Today, some Islamic scholars 
and political figures, such as Ali Bulac and Abul-Ela Maadi, have asserted that the ummah should 
be a broad-based, modern alternative to Western-style secular civil society, but should still be 
democratic.[1]  
Although Olivier Roy contends that globalization “is de-ethnicizing Islam,” can a religion-based 
virtual state override other facets of individual cultures and ethnicities?[2]  
Enduring Cultural Differences 
Cultural differences have not been swept away. Writing from Indonesia in the aftermath of the 
2006 Danish cartoon controversy, Karim Raslan observed: “Yes, we are part of the extended 
family of believers, the ummah. We cannot help but feel some sense of solidarity with our co-
religionists in Damascus, Tehran, or Cairo. But the explosiveness of the Arab street doesn’t 
translate, somehow, to the tropics. Many of us have a growing suspicion that we are culturally 
different from our Arabic- and Urdu-speaking brethren, perhaps more tolerant and less 
emotional.”[3]  
Information flows affect the political character of Islam. Satellite television and the Internet have 
brought the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis—and, more recently, the war between 
Hizbollah and Israel—to a global audience. In spring 2002 a Zogby poll found that 65 percent of 
Indonesians rated Palestine as “the most important” or “a very important” issue, and the 2003 
Pew Global Attitudes Survey reported that in Indonesia 68 percent of poll respondents named 
Yasser Arafat as the world figure in whom they had most confidence.[4] Ayman al-Zawahiri, al 
Qaeda’s second-in-command, recognized this and wrote in his book Knights Under the Banner of 
the Prophet: “The fact that must be acknowledged is that the issue of Palestine is the cause that 
has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the past 50 
years.”[5]  
Communications media can make the remote seem proximate, particularly when news is 
presented in real time and by so many providers. In this way the Palestinian or resident of Qana 
becomes a neighbor of the Indonesian, and within the global village a neighbor’s plight attracts 
much interest. That is not to say, however, that a single political outlook will take hold throughout 
the Muslim world or that priorities will be uniform.  
One reason there is so much uncertainty about Islamic connections is that attitudes about Muslim 
identity vary from country to country, even in predominantly Muslim nations. A Pew Global 
Attitudes survey published in 2005 asked, “Do you consider yourself a national citizen first or a 
Muslim first?” These were the answers from Muslim respondents in six countries:  
 • Pakistan : national citizen 7 percent; Muslim 79 percent.  
• Morocco : national citizen 7 percent; Muslim 70 percent.  
• Jordan : national citizen 23 percent; Muslim 63 percent.  
• Turkey : national citizen 29 percent; Muslim 43 percent.  
• Indonesia : national citizen 35 percent; Muslim 39 percent.  
• Lebanon : national citizen 30 percent; Muslim 30 percent.[6]  
These results were affected by the political and cultural characteristics of the individual countries 
and indicate that shifts might occur within a given country depending on the politics of the 
moment or particular events, perhaps including how news is covered and information is provided 
through the Internet or other sources. The results from Lebanon, for instance, presumably 
reflected the nationalist tremors that were shaking that country around the time the polling was 
done. Blogs and websites, as well as traditional media, helped fuel the surge in nationalist 
political activism there, as was evident after the assassination in 2005 of Rafik Hariri.  
Unifying the Ummah 
Pulling the ummah closer together is not a new idea. In the twentieth century, groundwork was 
laid by men such as Haasan al-Banna, a founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Beginning in the 
1920s, he championed “the Islamization of society.” His movement, according to Reza Aslan, 
“represented the first modern attempt to present Islam as an all-encompassing religious, political, 
social, economic, and cultural system. Islam, in al-Banna’s view, represented a universal ideology 
superior to all other systems of social organization the world had known.”[7] Another Egyptian 
Islamist, Sayyid Qutb, endorsed a transterritorial ummah unified by Islamic governance.[8] Now, 
four decades after Qutb’s death, “transterritorial” has an expanded meaning as the concept is 
reshaped by technologies that make conventional boundaries less relevant. Olivier Roy has 
observed that the ummah “no longer has anything to do with a territorial entity. It has to be 
thought of in abstract or imaginary terms.”[9]  
Roy’s point is grounded in the realities of new media and access to information. While satellite 
television is transnational, the Internet may be considered supranational because boundaries 
within and among states are not merely inconsequential, they need not, in the cyberworld, exist at 
all. An example of how this theory takes shape in practice can be seen in the success of Islam 
Online (www.islamonline.net), which provides news, general information about Islam, “shari’ah 
corner” featuring “live fatwa”, and much more, all available in Arabic and English. (The Arabic and 
English sites have different staff members, content, and audiences, and one rarely translates 
material from the other.) The site lists among its goals: “To strengthen the ties of unity and 
affiliation between the members of the Islamic community and support informational and cultural 
exchange. To expand awareness of important events in the Arab, Islamic and larger worlds. To 
build confidence and a spirit of hope among Muslims.”  
In early 2006, Islam Online was attracting an average of about 13 million page views and 1.5 
million unique visitors per month, and its management wants to expand this audience by offering 
content in additional languages, such as French and Turkish. It employs about 300 staff members, 
most working in Cairo, and uses material from approximately 1,500 correspondents, Islamic 
scholars, and other contributors, many of whom are not Muslims. For the English-language 
version, which attracts 25 percent of the page views, about half the audience is in the United 
States.  
For Islam Online and other such media organizations, translated material is an essential part of 
reaching a truly global audience. Al Jazeera made its name through its Arabic newscasts and 
then attracted much attention when it announced plans for English-language Al Jazeera 
International. There was considerable public discussion, especially in the non-Islamic world, 
about how this channel’s content and political tone might differ from that of the Arabic channel, 
and how it would be received by Western audiences and governments. Because of the hostility 
toward Al Jazeera from some quarters—notably the U.S. government—the potential expansion of 
Al Jazeera’s influence was viewed with concern, despite the new channel, as it was gradually 
unveiled, looking more like CNN or the BBC than its Arabic sibling.  
While this was debated and Al Jazeera International’s launch was delayed due to technical 
problems (and, some insiders say, the antipathy of the Arab channel’s journalists toward their 
mostly non-Arab AJI colleagues), the parent organization’s management quietly announced that it 
would also begin Al Jazeera Urdu. With editorial content and translation supervised by the Al 
Jazeera bureau in Pakistan, this channel will, once underway, consist primarily of the Arabic 
channel’s contents dubbed into Urdu for a potential audience estimated at 110 million. Al Jazeera 
also plans to eventually deliver its product in additional languages, such as Turkish.  
Again from policymakers’ standpoint, the potential political repercussions of this venture are worth 
considering. If one accepts the argument (debatable though it may be) that Al Jazeera’s Arabic 
coverage features an anti-American slant that rouses “the Arab street” against U.S. and other 
Western interests, delivering that coverage to an additional huge Muslim audience could 
significantly affect the wider contest for global public opinion. And if it reinforces an “us-against-
them” mentality among its viewers, it may escalate the adversarial nature of their relationship with 
the non-Islamic West—something else that U.S. policy planners must weigh.  
Regardless of what the West does, effects of such globalized media influence may be enhanced 
by the disillusionment some Muslims feel toward secular citizenship in their own states. As Olivier 
Roy asks, “What is a true Muslim land, in a time when many radical Muslims consider that all the 
regimes ruling Muslim countries are illegitimate?”[10] For these Muslims, who feel greater loyalty 
to Islam itself than to any particular homeland, the ummah as superstate may be the “true Muslim 
land,” tangible or not.  
The Internet as New Public Space 
In a virtual community, writes Jon Anderson, the Internet serves as “a new public space, which 
enables a new class of interpreters, who are facilitated by this medium to address and thereby to 
reframe Islam’s authority and expression for those like themselves and others who come there.” 
The virtual space, says Anderson, “does not facilitate the spokesperson-activists of established 
institutions, but draws instead on a broader range of new interpreters or newly visible interpreters 
of Islam.”[11]  
Among these is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who, through his presence on Al Jazeera and Islam Online, 
has established himself as one of the Islamic world’s best-known public figures. Born in 1926, al-
Qaradawi studied theology at al-Azhar University and spent time in an Egyptian prison camp 
because of his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. He has written about the Islamic awakening—his 
many books have sold in the hundreds of thousands—and emphasized the important role of the 
ulama—religious scholars—as its leaders. He has championed the independence of the ulama 
and argued that Islam requires freedom of thought and discussion.[12]  
Al-Qaradawi has proved himself adept at shaping his message to meet the demands of new 
media. As Anderson notes, he is “wholly orthodox in theology but expressing it in a more modern 
idiom that attracts a transnational audience among professional middle classes.”[13] Modern 
does not mean moderate. Al-Qaradawi has endorsed suicide bombing attacks on Israeli civilians 
as a legitimate tactic in the effort to reclaim Muslim territory.[14] He also, however, issued a fatwa 
that defends democracy not as a form of unbelief but as a system that properly gives people the 
right to choose their leaders without compulsion and to question and remove them.[15] On 
another occasion, he denounced the now deceased Abu Musab al Zarqawi, leader of al Qaeda in 
Iraq, as a murderer.  
Whatever Al-Qaradawi’s views on particular issues, he unquestionably wields greater influence 
by virtue of being a media personality. His political clout as “the global mufti” is enhanced by the 
reach and frequency that satellite television and the Internet provide.  
The Qur'an Online 
Beyond personalities, the Qur’an is central to Islam’s online presence. This is, in part, a function 
of da’wah, the rallying of believers to the faith or, as some would have it, the exhortation to return 
to pre-modern, unblemished Islam. (Those who advocate this approach apparently see no irony 
in using the Internet to turn back the clock.) Even websites that present news and softer features 
place primary emphasis on the religion itself. The IslamiCity website (www.islamicity.com) 
streams Radio Al Islam, which offers calls to prayer, recitations of the Qur’an, tools to aid in 
searching the Qur’an’s content and memorizing the text, as well as locating mosques and 
determining local times for prayer.  
Unlike the holy books of other religions, the Qur’an is considered to be the untouched word of 
God, as revealed to God’s messenger, Mohammed, who then recited it. This is the essence of its 
sacred nature. Its recitation remains central to the practice of Islam, so when it is broadcast or 
presented online, its words and rhythms find a large and rapt audience. Just as the muezzins’ call 
to prayer brings people to mosques, so too does a media-delivered call or recitation pull together 
the virtual community.  
The digital minbar, or cyber-pulpit, is of special importance to diasporic Muslims. It should be 
noted that even in far-flung centers of Muslim immigration such as Paris, London, and New York, 
imams and mosques quickly establish themselves, and so Muslim residents there do not need to 
depend solely on a virtual connection for religious sustenance. As a platform for globalized Islam, 
however, online offerings may have special allure: a connection to a nostalgia-misted past and a 
remedy for homesickness.  
In reality, economic hardship and political conflict may have made this earlier life far less 
attractive than it appears in memory. Nevertheless, new media may create such a convenient 
bridge across distance and time that a website or a satellite channel can become cherished as a 
tie to real or imagined “home.” Peter Mandaville notes that “more than anything else, the Internet 
and other information technologies provide spaces where Muslims, who often find themselves to 
be a marginalized or extreme minority group in many Western communities, can go in order to 
find others ‘like them.’”[16]  
Globalization of Islam and the Media  
Al Jazeera’s approach to certain news stories illustrates how globalized journalism can affect 
globalized Islam. Sam Cherribi writes that Al Jazeera used its coverage of the banning of the 
hijab, a veil, from French schools “to build a global Muslim identity [and] mobilize a shared public 
opinion.” According to Cherribi, Al Jazeera framed the veil story in its reporting from 2002-2005 
as “not only a problem for girls and women in public schools in France; it is a problem for Muslim 
women and men around the world.” The veil coverage, he says, was part of a “civilization 
message” delivered by Al Jazeera, in this case because “the veil gives the immediate recognition 
of otherness: non-Muslims do not wear it.”[17] Cherribi argues that Al Jazeera is a religious 
channel, more CBN than CNN, with an agenda that focuses on Islam even above pan-Arabism. 
Others, however, contend that Al Jazeera’s content is relatively balanced when it addresses 
religious topics, reflecting the intricate spider web of Islamism and pan-Arabism that is part of the 
mindset of many of the people who live in the Arab world and watch that channel.  
Beyond the news coverage of specific issues, the importance of new media is found in its 
providing an arena where the future of Islam will be contested. This takes place on several levels: 
doctrinal debate between moderates and conservatives about defining the beliefs and practices 
of “true Islam,” and political argument about Islam’s stance toward the non-Islamic world. For 
those who argue that Islam is not a party to a “clash of civilizations” but is instead undergoing an 
internal struggle to determine its direction, the huge number of media venues—particularly 
online—provides the opportunity to watch the various sides present their cases.  
For this direction-setting process, the Internet and satellite television transform and transcend 
traditional hierarchies. Robert Hefner notes that “the classically educated scholars (ulama) who 
long dominated the religious tradition awoke to face a host of new challengers, including secularly 
educated new Muslim intellectuals, independent preachers, Internet Islamists, and other 
beneficiaries of new technologies and organizations.”[18] By expanding the number of voices to 
which a mass audience may listen, the Internet, writes Merlyna Lim, “tremendously enhances the 
prospects for an egalitarian type of communications in which every voice is potentially as 
important as another….By learning from the Internet, people can feel they have acquired enough 
Islamic knowledge to guide important life decisions without having recourse to more traditional 
scholars such as an imam or Islamic teachers in local mosques. At the same time, radical 
fundamentalist groups can also use the Internet…[to] directly reach ordinary Muslims in 
cyberspace.”[19]  
Another aspect of Islam being affected by the Internet is the role of Arabic. Much as the Catholic 
Church relied for centuries on Latin, regardless of whether people understood it, many Islamic 
ulama insist that Arabic is the true language of Islam because it was spoken by Mohammed and 
so even non-Arabic speakers should learn at least enough of the language to be able to recite 
parts of the Qur’an in it. In theory, the common language should further Islamic unity.  
A single language that everyone within the ummah could speak might make increased cohesion 
more feasible, but in practice, reliance on Arabic is intrinsically limiting. Most Muslims do not 
speak Arabic, and Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson note that “while Arabic remains a universal 
medium at one level, language differences within the Muslim world significantly constrain the 
circulation of ideas. Some Indonesian religious intellectuals, often trained in the United States and 
Canada, interpret developments in the Arab world, but virtually no Arab intellectuals follow 
debates on Muslim intellectual and political life in Southeast Asia.”[20]  
With the Internet providing information in many languages, particularly English, dependence on 
Arabic is reduced and the audience expands. Jocelyne Cesari says that abandonment of Arabic 
and other ancestral languages “has led to the growth of ‘vernacular’ forms of Islam in Europe and 
America, where sermons, religious literature, and public discussions are increasingly in English, 
which has now become the second language of Muslims all over the ummah.”[21] Traditionalists 
may lament the disincentive to learn Arabic, but an increased number of languages used in 
information dissemination could enable more people to feel that they are truly part of the ummah 
and could contribute to the cohesion that new communications technologies may foster. This 
acceptance of linguistic diversity is particularly important for websites and blogs, which within a 
short time have grown spectacularly in their number and range of outlook.  
Sufism, which is criticized by some fundamentalists as non-Islamic while its advocates say it is 
the true essence of Islam, has seen its tenets debated and its visibility increased through new 
media. Carl Ernst writes that Sufi websites have been primarily created by one segment of the 
Sufi population: “members of the cosmopolitan and globalizing classes: either emigrant Sufi 
leaders establishing new bases in America and Europe, immigrant technocrats who happen to be 
connected to Sufi lineages, or Euro-American converts to Sufism in one form or another.” Ernst 
also notes that one Sufi leader in Southeast Asia, when asked if he was interested in setting up a 
website, said, “We are not vendors who hawk our wares in the bazaar…people come to us.” But 
his Malaysian followers have set up an online site on which they sell English-language 
publications by leading masters of the order.[22]  
Building a Global Ummah 
One example of the Web being used specifically to build a global ummah can be seen in the 
online presence of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Party of Liberation, which is reportedly active in at least 40 
countries. Its cyber-presence—with a principal website available in Arabic, English, Russian, 
Turkish, Urdu, and German—illustrates how a broader ummah might coalesce through use of the 
Internet.  
According to Globalsecurity.org, Hizb ut-Tahrir is “a radical Islamic political movement that seeks 
'implementation of pure Islamic doctrine' and the creation of an Islamic caliphate in Central 
Asia....The ultimate goal of this secretive sectarian group is to unite the entire ummah, or Islamic 
world community, into a single caliphate.”[23] Although no acts of violence have been directly 
attributed to Hizb ut-Tahrir, several governments have labeled it a terrorist organization. As of 
July 2006, the party was not on the U.S. State Department’s list of foreign terrorist groups, but in 
Russia and some Central Asian countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir activists have been jailed, with a flurry of 
arrests in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in mid-2006.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir, writes Zeyno Baran, “has essentially constructed a virtual Islamist community in 
cyberspace, frequented by members, prospective members, and sympathizers. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
websites are designed to draw in Web-surfing Muslims who feel alienated from the societies in 
which they live, providing them with a place to obtain news and analysis, exchange ideas, and 
feel part of a global Muslim community.”[24]  
Hizb ut-Tahrir relies on cyberspace as a political location in which organizing a virtual state can 
take place. Except for occasions when the party undertakes localized activity, such as protesting 
a proposed British anti-terrorism statute, conventional borders are disregarded and traditional 
sovereignty is also treated as irrelevant. The ummah as righteous political entity supersedes such 
secular constraints, and cyberspace rather than conventionally defined territory is seen as a 
congenial home for the ummah.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al Jazeera, Islam Online, and other ventures using new media may have varied 
political goals or business plans, but they all aspire to build global constituencies and to do so 
with Islam at the heart of their efforts.  
Despite the opportunities afforded by new communications and information technologies, 
obstacles to Islamic unity remain formidable. Muslim-versus-Muslim warfare in Iraq displays the 
deep wounds sectarianism can inflict. On a less sanguinary level, Muslims’ worldviews differ so 
much that finding common ground for a Sufi mystic and a Hizb ut-Tahrir strategist may be difficult. 
Fundamentalist and modernist may each feel strongly that the other is following a path toward 
disaster. Such diversity does not mean that the ummah cannot come together, but if it does it will 
be loosely knit.  
It would, however, still be a significant geopolitical presence, and the weave of its fabric could be 
tightened by external factors, such as a perceived common foe. The same new media that 
contribute to cohesion in the first place will deliver information that can increase unity. When 
images from Gaza and Lebanon in 2006 showed the agony of fellow Muslims, the reports that 
were most trusted were being provided by Arab/Muslim news organizations that are highly 
credible among their particular regional and global audiences. When their reports reach 
households in Cairo, Karachi, Djakarta, and Paris, Muslims feel the pain of other Muslims and 
reflexively seek the embrace of the community of Islam.  
Islam has no monopoly on high-tech communication tools. Other religions also use them; 
Christian websites and blogs outnumber all others. Other diasporic communities rely on satellite 
channels and online forums to sustain identity. But Islam and the members of the global Muslim 
community are different. At this point in history, Islam is affecting how much of the world works 
and is a factor in many of the world’s armed conflicts. That is why it makes sense for the United 
States, among others, to devise a policy toward the ummah as well as toward nations.  
For good or ill, Islam is a special case, and policy makers in the United States and elsewhere in 
the non-Islamic world should more seriously contemplate how a realized ummah might change 
the world. 
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